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A basic assumption in modern safety management is that accidents are preventable through effective
feedback control; i, c. through mechanisms by which information about accidents and near misses is utilised
as a basis to increase the level of safety. In spite of their popularity, however, previous research has shown
that it is frequently difficult to make Accident and Near Miss Analysis Systems (ANMAS) work according
to intentions. The present paper presents results from a comparative study of ANMASs in the German
nuclear industry and the Norwegian offshore industry. Both industries have a strong emphasis on incident
recording and analysis. However, there are important differences between the two industries regarding what
events are understood as "incidents", what information on incidents is collected, how the information is
processed, and how corrective actions are developed and implemented. These differences are analysed in
light of distinctive features of the two industries (e.g. risk scenarios, technology, organisation), legislative
factors, and social and cultural variables. It is argued that although different industry sectors may have a lot
to learn from each other regarding how to handle accident and near miss reporting, the efficiency of a
particular ANMAS must be evaluated relative to the industry's frame conditions.
INTRODUCTION
A basic assumption in safety management is that accidents
are preventable through effective feedback control; i. e.
through mechanisms by which information about accidents and
[lear misses is utilised as a basis for actions to increase the
level of safety (Kjcllen, 1998; Sitkin, 1995; van der Schaaf,
Lucas & Hale, 1991). The prevalent use of accident and near
miss databases in high-risk industries, and the recourses spent
an registering and analysing information on such events, arc
two manifestations of the importance attached to historical data
In modern safety management. The latter years rapid advances
in information technology have further strengthened the role
played by accident and near miss data. User friendly software,
fast working computers and networks have brought safety
managers an increasingly vast amount of easily accessible data,
and have made it possible to perform extensive statistical
analyses in a matter of minutes. Monthly safety reports, causal
analyses and development of risk reducing measures, are some
well-known examples of how experience data are utilised in
:he industry's day-to-day safety work.
In spite of their popularity, the research literature does not
give unequivocal support to the usefulness ANMAS in safety
management (see Ringstad, 2000 for a review). van der Schaaf
:199l) and Kjellen (1998), although the conceptualise the
fifferent sub-phases somewhat differently, both describe ideal
requirements to an AN1\1AS according to an input-throughput-
output model. The input phase should generate complete and
valid data, the throughput phase should result in identification
of relevant causes and statistical patterns, and the output phase
should lead to corrective actions that can be implemented in a
cost-efficient manner.
For our purpose, the general phases described by van der
Schaaf (1991) and Kjellen (1998) wiJl serve as a guide when
we compare accident and near miss reporting in two industries:
the German nuclear industry (ONI) and the Norwegian
offshore industry (NOI). The objective afthe study is twofold.
First, it seems reasonable to assume that a comparative study
of the way accident and near miss reporting is organised will
reflect fundamental differences between the two industries.
The two ANMASs have different histories, are developed in
different national and corporate cultures, and have somewhat
different main functions.
Second, although there exist fundamental differences
between the two industries, a comparison of the way event
reporting and analysis is organised may still offer a potential
for learning. By pointing at alternative ways of organising the
event analysis, it is imaginable that useful lessons can be learnt
about shortcomings and strong points in the two systems. Thus,
a comparative study of ANMASs will ideally result in insights
that are relevant both with regard to stable and important
"background variables", and to features of the ANMASs that
are more easily modified and improved.
The present paper is based on two independent studies of
ANMASs in ONI and NOr. In both studies interviews with
operative personnel, safety delegates, safety officers and
managers, and plant/installation managers were conducted. In
addition, legal requirements, technical procedures and in-house
regulations were reviewed.
THE INDUSTRIES - A BRIEF OVERVIEW
The GNI, with 20 power plants on 15 sites, was
responsible for 30% of Germany's energy production in 1998.
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The NOr has an even more significant impact of the national
economy; in 1997, the industry was responsible for 38% of the
Norwegian export. The Norwegian offshore industry comprises
about 100 fixed and movable installations. Deregulation of
markets, privatisation, and increased environmental taxes
during the last years have reduced the profit margins in both
industries. Still, it is not possible to detect a reduced emphasis
on safety in official statistics. In GNI, the number of events
with varying risk potential have not increased (BfS, 1999), and
in the NOI, the number of registered personal injuries, after a
strong decrease since the industry's conception in the early
1970's, have been quite stable for the last few years (NPD,
1999).
Both the nuclear industry and the offshore industry are
high-risk enterprises in the sense that they exhibit complex
interactions and tight couplings (Perrow, 1984). Furthermore,
both industries have to control tremendous amounts of energy,
and the potential for events with catastrophic proportions is
thus a factor that both enterprises have to consider.
Even though similar safety challenges exist within the two
industries, GNl may be said to have a stronger focus on the
technical subsystem (i.e. control of the nuclear chain reaction).
On the other hand, NO! has a higher complexity within the
social subsystem due to a low degree of standardisation of
equipment, and a vast number of suppliers and sub-contractors.
Furthennore, the probability of occupational accidents is
comparatively high in the offshore industry due to ship and
helicopter transports, work in rough weather, and sub-sea
operations.
Legal requirements
In GNI, the procedures related to incident reporting shall
be documented in the licensee's operation manuals. The
registration of incidents is based on well-defined technical
criteria (e.g. KTA, 1985). Every safety relevant component of
a nuclear power plant is identified in relevant regulations
(BMU, 1992). In the case of a malfunction the incident, its
causes and preventive measures should be reported to the
authorities. The focus on safety critical components is in part
due to the federal structure of Germany. This structure, with a
high degree of local autonomy, necessitates safety parameters
that are easy to communicate and compare across regional
adaptations of national safety legislation.
In NOr, it is mandatory to report fatal accidents, serious
personal injuries, personal injuries requiring professional
treatment, lost time accidents and other incidents of relevance
to safety to. In addition, an oil company has an obligation to
keep a record of all incidents registered on the installations
operated by the company, and what corrective actions have
been taken to prevent recurrences (NPD, 1985).
INPUT· COLLECTION OF INCIDENT DATA
Whereas each NOI installation typically reports about 900
incidents every year, in ONI only 10-40 incidents are reported
from each plant. In addition to different legal requirements, the
number of reported incidents is a result of different incident
definitions. In NOI incidents are understood as an undesired
event that could or does result in loss, i.e. harm to people,
damage to property, loss of process and/or environmental
damage (DnV, 1998). GNI focus on the availability of
predefined safety systems or radiation exposure above certain
limits, which means that an incident is defined by criteria given
by the authorities (BMU, 1992). In this regime an incident
occurs if the safety systems have not withstood an evolving
incident. Both definitions are related to the outcome of an
incident, but the NOI definition includes potentially harmful
events and events that are related to occupational safety on a
broader basis than ONI.
In both industries it was possible to identify three groups
of potential incident reporters: managers, safety experts (e.g.
safety officers and safety delegates), and operative personnel.
In ONI the detection of incidents is frequently based on
inspections or system warnings. In NOI, on the other hand,
operative personnel detect and register most incidents during
normal work operations. Again, the difference in reporting
practices is partly due to different incident definitions. In
addition, offshore work operations are frequently exposing
operative personnel to occupational risks. This generates a
high number of reports on comparatively minor incidents from
operative personneL
Quality assurance of the registered information was
considered critical in both GNI and NO!. Typically, an
incident was discussed at team meetings, and the information
was evaluated by a number of persons (e.g. managers and
safety officers) before the reporl was officially acknowledged.
In NOI only a small portion (about one percent) was formally
investigated. In ONI, the majority of reported incidents
instigated an investigation. However, due to the high number
of reported incidents in NOl, the absolute number of formal
incident investigations was quite identical for the average
offshore installation and nuclear power plant.
THROUGHPUT· PROCESSING OF INCIDENT DATA
In GNI, the significance of an incident is rated according
to its impact on the environment and the defence-in-depth-
degradation (IAEA, 1992). In NO!, on the other hand, each
incident is given a risk weight according to the incident's
estimated loss potential (i.e. what consequences for personnel,
environment and/or material assets the event could lead to if it
took place under slightly different circumstances). In both
industries the real or potential effects of an incident determined
how the incident was processed. In general, the more serious
incidents were analysed and handled by central parts of the
organisation, while less serious incidents were handled at a
local level.
In GNI different in-house ANMASs are used. Significant
incidents are reported to the BEVOR database, which is
administrated by an independent operator. Both the BEVOR
operator and the authorities perform statistical analyses of
incident data (Kotthoff, 1999, BfS, 1999). Information on
specific incidents is distributed to all nuclear power plants.
Besides the formal ANMAS there exist stable and important
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informal contacts between managers of different plants. Many
of the interviewees in the ONI mentioned the importance of
this contact for experience transfer related to specific incidents.
International experience transfer is handled IABA (JABA,
1989) who administers the IRS database which is structurally
similar to the BEVOR database (Strater, 1997). Every operator
has access to the BEVOR and the IRS database and receives
periodical safety reports from the databases.
In NOr, it was possible to observe the same distinction
between in-house, inter-organisational ANMAs, and databases
operated by the authorities. In 1992, major oil companies and
offshore contractors launched a joint project for the
development of a common ANMAS. The central database is
operated by an independent operator and available on the
Internet for subscribers (Synergi, 1999). The authorities
operate an additional database that is used to generate analyses
of relevance to the industry sector as a whole.
Three main methods are in use for the identification of
root causes to incidents in GNI: the Assessment of Significant
Event Teams (IAEA, 1990), the Human Performance
Enhancement System (INPO, 1994) and the VOB method for
optimization of men-machine interfaces (VOB, 1994). In NO!
the International Safety Rating System (DnV, 1998) has a
domineering position, and the causal analyses are typically
performed according to the causal model underlying this safety
management concept (see Bird & Germain, 1986).
However, although the specific methods and causal
models are different at a superficial level, both industries seem
to be strongly influenced by Heinrich' (1931) domino model of
incident causation. This model indicates an inherent
orderliness concerning the causes of accidents. The causal
chain progress from specific and immediate determinants to
global and more distant factors. Furthermore, the model points
at managerial or organisational factors as a common origin to
incidents, and it upholds a distinction between human error and
technological failure in the different phases of an incident.
OUTPUT· INCIDENT DATA AND DECISION MAKING
Both industries use periodical statistics to identify factors
that are relevant to the safety performance of an organisation
or specific plant/installation. In the GNI the frequency of
component failure is emphasised, while the NOI monitors the
frequency of occupational accidents and incidents with major
safety relevance (e.g. gas leaks). Both ONI and NO! use
aggregated data as a basis for development of general
corrective actions. However, interviewees in both industries
claimed that the time lag between incident recording and the
implementation of general corrective actions was too long.
In GNI every reported incident has initiates a scheduled
task order, which can be said to represent a specific corrective
action. In NOI each incident on the average generates two
corrective actions. The corrective actions related to individual
incidents are mainly aimed at plant/ installation specific
factors, and have limited value as general risk reducing
measures.
Interviewees from both industries reported general
problems related to safety management based on experiential
data. Is an improved safety record a result of corrective
actions, or is it attributable to other factors (e.g. automation or
a more experienced workforce)? Is historical information
important in avoiding future mishaps when environmental,
organisational, and technological parameters are constantly
changing? How can history help us to avoid a catastrophe that
so far has not occurred? In NOI some the interviewees
expressed a form of "reporting fatigue". Although they agreed
that incident reporting is an important tool in safety
management, they questioned the need to report every little
deviance. They expressed scepticism to the utility of detailed
analyses of "small oil spills on the deck", and argued that the
red tape associated with incident reporting in some cases made
it an inefficient way to increase safety.
DISCUSSION
The present study has pointed at differences and
similarities in the accident and near miss reporting practices in
two industries. Although important details have been left out
from the analysis, some general patterns seem to be
identifiable.
Both GNI and NOI are high-risk industries with a
potential to cause major accidents or catastrophes.
Furthermore, both industries have a strong focus on incident
reporting and analysis. A common understanding of the causes
to seemed to be identifiable, and both industries submit
incident information to in-house databases, databases at an
industry sector level, and to databases operated by the
authorities. Feedback from the databases to operative parts of
the organisation is made in form of statistical analyses of
aggregated data and detailed analyses of single incidents.
There are also important differences between the two
industries with regard to how incident information is collected,
processed and used. In GNI, the focus is on well-defined safety
systems and components, while NOI operates with a more
extensive understanding of incidents. These differences are
related to legislative and conceptual factors, but must also be
seen in light of structural characteristics of the two industries.
In ONI the standardisation of safety critical components is far
more extensive than is the case in NOr. This makes it possible
to investigate component reliability in greater detail, which in
turn influence the type of data reported into the ANMAS. It is
furthermore likely that the many manual work operations
performed in NOI have induced an understanding of the
incident concept that has a strong focus on occupational
accidents. A final structural difference between the two
industries is their risk potential for third parties. While a
nuclear power plant can be perceived as a direct threat to the
civilian population, this is hardly the case for an offshore
installation. This factor may have lead GNI to focus on few
and serious events of relevance to the environment, while NOI
have maintained a focus on the safety for the work force.
Finally, the different reporting practices in GNI and NO!
seem to be related to somewhat different safety management
policies. In NO! the so-called iceberg theory (Bird and
Germain, 1986) is a popular way to conceptualise the
relationship between classes of incidents with varying loss
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potential. For instance, the theory states that there exist a fixed
relationship between minor personal injuries and fatal
accidents. Since there are few incidents with major
consequences, experiential safety management should be based
on extensive registration of minor accidents and near misses. If
these events are prevented, it is conjectured that the probability
of major events is reduced as well. In GNI, the iceberg theory
does not seem to be in high fashion, a fact that is reflected in
the focus on serious incidents in the industry's ANMASs.
Thus, accident and near miss analysis systems are
embedded in a context that strongly influence how incidents
are reported and analysed, and how corrective actions are
developed and implemented. This context consists of social
and legislative factors, structural characteristics of different
industry sectors, and safety management philosophies. At a
general level, this means that it may be difficult to point at
universal requirements to ANMASs. Instead of evaluating a
particular ANMAS according to an ideal, it may be more
fruitful to ask whether an ANMAS works relative to important
frame conditions and background variables. This view
furthermore implies that comparisons of safety results between
e.g. industry sectors should be done with great care.
To say that the success of an ANMAS should be evaluated
in a context does not mean that it is impossible for different
industry sectors to learn from each other. For instance, it can
be argued that Nor has a lot to learn from the way ON!
highlights and handles clearly defined incidents with a large
loss potential. On the other hand, ONI may draw useful lessons
from the way NOI tries to use information on small deviancies
to control the total risk associated with offshore oil and gas
exploitation. Attempts to establish experience transfer between
industry sectors or national boundaries should, however,
always start with the question: "It works for them, but will it
work for us?"
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